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1. Introduction	The	Court	of	Justice	(the	Court)	discussed	pre-installed	software	from	the	point	of	view	of	unfair	commercial	practices	and	consumer	protection	in	a	recent	preliminary	ruling	in	Case	C-310/15	
Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony.1		The	case	essentially	addresses	the	interpretation	of	the	Unfair	Commercial	Practices	Directive	2005/29/EC	(the	UCPD)2,	in	particular	the	notions	of	unfair	commercial	practice3	and	misleading	omission.4	The	UCPD	aims	to	contribute	to	the	functioning	of	the	Internal	Market	and	achieve	a	high	level	of	consumer	protection	by	harmonizing	the	law	on	unfair	commercial	practices	that	harm	consumers’	economic	interests.5	The	Directive	entails	a	relatively	complex	system	of	regulation,	including	a	general	prohibition	of	unfair	practices	(Article	5)	and	more	specific	provisions	on	practices	which,	in	particular,	are	unfair.	Moreover,	the	Directive	contains	a	‘black	list’	of	practices	which	are	always	considered	unfair.6	The	judgment	in	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony	clarifies,	in	particular,	that	EU	rules	prohibiting	unfair	commercial	practices	in	business-to-consumer	(B2C)	relationships	may	not	easily	be	seen	as	prohibiting	a	sales	practice	where	a	certain	type	of	computer	may	only	be	acquired	equipped	with	pre-installed	software.	Moreover,	when	selling	to	a	consumer	a	computer	with	pieces	of	pre-installed	software,	it	is	sufficient	to	indicate	the	overall	price	of	the	product	but	it	is	not	necessary	to	communicate	the	price	of	each	item	of	software	separately.		As	observed	from	a	broader	EU	law	perspective,	this	is	not	the	first	time	that	software	and	tying	products	intended	for	consumers	have	raised	concerns.	Under	competition	law,	for	instance,	similar	issues	surfaced	in	the	prominent	Microsoft	case	in	the	context	of	abuse	of	a	dominant	market	position.7		Against	this	background,	cases	such	as	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony	–	now	discussed	by	the	Court	solely	from	the	perspective	of	the	UCPD	but	hypothetically	entailing	an	interesting	factual	setting	from	the	standpoint	of	other	bodies	of	norms	as	well	–	may	also	be	seen	as	inviting	critical	discussion	on	the	fragmented	nature	of	law	and	enforcement	systems		*	Zupančič	(LLM)	is	an	independent	lawyer	and	researcher;	Havu	(LLD)	works	as	a	Postdoctoral	Researcher	at	the	University	of	Helsinki.	1	Case	C-310/15	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony	Europe	Limited,	EU:C:2016:633.	2	Directive	2005/29/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	11	May	2005	concerning	unfair	business-to-consumer	commercial	practices	in	the	internal	market	and	amending	Council	Directive	84/450/EEC,	Directives	97/7/EC,	98/27/EC	and	2002/65/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	and	Regulation	(EC)	No	2006/2004	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	[2005]	OJ	L	149/22.	3	Ibid.,	Article	5.	4	Ibid.,	Article	7.	5	Ibid.,	in	particular	Article	1	and	Recitals	3–8,	11–20.	6	Ibid.,	see	in	particular	Articles	5–9	and	Annex	I;	see	further,	for	example,	N.	Reich	et	al.,	European	
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targeting	unfair	commercial	practices	or	unfair	trading,	competition	and	related	consumer	protection	in	the	EU.	
2. Factual	and	legal	background	In	December	2008,	Mr	Deroo-Blanquart	bought	a	Sony	personal	laptop	computer	model	VAIO	VGN-NR38E.	As	is	customary,	the	computer	came	with	pre-installed	software,	including	in	particular	the	Windows	Vista	Home	Premium	operating	system.	Subscribing	to	the	pre-installed	operating	system	requires	the	user	to	agree	to	an	‘end-user	licence	agreement’	(EULA)	the	first	time	the	computer	is	run.	The	user	can	also	opt	out	of	using	the	pre-installed	operating	system	by	not	agreeing	to	EULA,	as	Mr	Deroo-Blanquart	decided	to	do.8	However	–	and	probably	unlike	other	users	that	opt	out	of	using	pre-installed	software	–	Mr	Deroo-Blanquart	requested	reimbursement	of	the	part	of	the	purchase	price	which	corresponded	to	the	software.	Sony	refused,	stating	that	the	computer	and	software	form	a	unified	and	non-separable	offer.9	After	further	discussions,	Sony	offered	to	cancel	the	sale	and	reimburse	the	full	cost	of	€	549,	provided	that	Mr	Deroo-Blanquart	returned	the	computer.	Mr	Deroo-Blanquart	did	not	accept	and	eventually,	in	February	2011,	initiated	proceedings	in	the	District	Court	of	Asnières.	He	claimed	reimbursement	of	€	450	for	the	pre-installed	software	as	well	as	€	2500	compensation	for	damage	suffered	due	to	unfair	commercial	practices.	The	claims	were	dismissed,	and	Mr	Deroo-Blanquart	lodged	an	appeal	with	the	Versailles	Court	of	Appeal.	The	earlier	judgment	was	upheld	by	the	Court	of	Appeal,	which	stated	that	the	practice	in	question	‘did	not	constitute	the	unfair	commercial	practice	of	coercive	selling,	which	is	not	permitted	under	any	circumstances,	an	unfair	commercial	tying	practice,	or	a	misleading	or	aggressive	commercial	practice.’10		Mr	Deroo-Blanquart	pursued	a	further	appeal	before	the	Court	of	Cassation,	which,	after	noting	that	the	relevant	national	provisions	fell	within	the	scope	of	the	UCPD,	stayed	the	proceedings	and	submitted	to	the	Court	a	preliminary	ruling	request	entailing	the	following	interpretative	questions:	1)						Must	 Articles	5	 and	 7	 of	 [the	UCPD]	 be	 interpreted	 as	meaning	 that	 a	 combined	offer	 consisting	 of	 the	 sale	 of	 a	 computer	 equipped	 with	 pre-installed	 software	constitutes	a	misleading	unfair	commercial	practice	where	the	manufacturer	of	the	computer	 has,	 via	 its	 retailer,	 provided	 information	 on	 each	 item	 of	 pre-installed	software,	but	has	not	specified	the	cost	of	each	individual	component?	(2)						Must	 Article	5	 of	 [the	UCPD]	 be	 interpreted	 as	 meaning	 that	 a	 combined	 offer	consisting	 of	 the	 sale	 of	 a	 computer	 equipped	 with	 pre-installed	 software	constitutes	 an	 unfair	 commercial	 practice	 where	 the	 manufacturer	 leaves	 the	consumer	no	choice	other	than	to	accept	the	software	or	cancel	the	sale?	(3)						Must	 Article	5	 of	 [the	UCPD]	 be	 interpreted	 as	 meaning	 that	 a	 combined	 offer	consisting	 of	 the	 sale	 of	 a	 computer	 equipped	 with	 pre-installed	 software	
	8	Case	C-310/15	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony,	para.	18–19.	9	Ibid.,	para.	19–20.			10	Ibid.,	para.	20–24.		
constitutes	an	unfair	commercial	practice	where	the	consumer	is	unable	to	obtain	a	computer	which	is	not	equipped	with	software	from	the	computer	manufacturer?11 Because	the	provisions	in	question,	Articles	5	and	7	of	the	UCPD,	lay	down	a	general	prohibition	of	unfair	commercial	practices	and	prohibition	of	misleading	omissions	respectively,	and	are	deliberately	written	in	an	open	ended-manner,	every	clarification	from	the	Court	is	valuable.12	
3. Reasoning	of	the	Court	The	Court,	which	proceeded	to	judgment	without	an	Opinion	by	the	Advocate	General,	started	by	examining	the	second	and	third	questions	together.	In	essence,	the	issue	here	was	whether	the	sale	of	a	computer	with	tied-in	software,	with	no	possibility	of	buying	the	same	computer	without	the	software,	constitutes	an	unfair	commercial	practice	under	Article	5(2)	of	the	UCPD.13	The	Court	first	addressed	the	technicalities	of	the	issue.	It	noted	that	the	practice	of	so-called	combined	offers	indeed	falls	within	the	purview	of	commercial	practices	as	defined	in	the	UCPD,	Article	2(d),	as	is	also	established	in	case	law.14	Moreover,	only	the	practices	explicitly	listed	in	Annex	I	to	the	UCPD	are	automatically	considered	unfair.	Combined	offers	are	not	included	in	that	closed	list;	thus	they	are	not	and	may	not	be	categorically	prohibited,	so	that	closer	examination	of	the	situation	is	required.15	The	Court	pointed	out	that	in	order	to	find	a	practice	unfair,	Article	5(2)	of	the	UCPD	requires	that	two	cumulative	conditions	are	fulfilled.	First,	the	practice	has	to	be	contrary	to	standards	of	professional	diligence.	Second,	the	practice	has	to	materially	distort	or	be	likely	to	materially	distort	the	economic	behaviour	of	the	average	consumer	with	regard	to	the	product.	At	this	point	the	Court	was	also	careful	to	stress	the	notion	of	average	consumer,	which	is,	as	explained	in	the	UCPD,	Recital	18,	central	for	application	of	the	Directive.16	The	average	consumer	is	defined	as	an	individual	‘who	is	reasonably	well-informed	and	reasonably	observant	and	circumspect,	taking	into	account	social,	cultural	and	linguistic	factors.’17	Moving	on	to	analysis	of	the	first	condition	under	Article	5(2),	the	Court	remarked	that	professional	diligence	is	defined	in	Article	2(h)	of	the	UCPD	as	the	special	standard	of	skill	and	care	that	the	trader	can	be	reasonably	expected	to	demonstrate	towards	the	consumer,	proportionate	with	honest	market	practice	and/or	the	applicable	principle	of	good	faith	in	the	particular	field.18	Studying	the	circumstances	of	the	present	case,	the	Court	noted,	on	the	basis	of	a	market	analysis	provided	to	it,	that	the	sale	of	computers	with	pre-installed	software	meets	the	expectations	of	most	consumers	and	a	significant	portion	of	consumers	prefer	the	arrangement.	Additionally,	Mr	Deroo-Banquart	was	appropriately	informed	about	the	items	of		11	Ibid.,	para.	26.	12	See	also	Recitals	13–20	of	the	UCPD.	13		Case	C-310/15	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony,	para.	27.		14	Ibid.,	para.	28;	see	also	Joined	Cases	C-261/07	and	299/07	VTB-VAB	v	Total	Belgium,	EU:C:2009:244,	para.	50–52.	15	Case	C-310/15	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony,	para.	29–31;	see	also	Joined	Cases	C-261/07	and	299/07	VTB-
VAB	v	Total	Belgium,	para.	51–62.	16	Case	C-310/15	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony,	para.	32.	17	The	UCPD,	Recital	18.	18	Case	C-310/15	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony,	para.	33;	the	UCPD,	Article	2(h).	
software	pre-installed	on	the	relevant	computer.	Furthermore,	he	had	been	offered	the	options	of	subscribing	to	EULA	and	using	the	pre-installed	software	or	cancelling	the	sale.19	The	Court	concluded	that	the	circumstances	in	this	case	‘are	likely	to	satisfy	the	requirements	of	honest	market	practices	or	of	the	principle	of	good	faith’	and	the	trader	thus	demonstrated	necessary	care	towards	the	consumer.20		In	its	evaluation	of	the	second	condition	of	Article	5(2),	the	Court	again	turned	to	concept	definitions	in	the	UCPD,	particularly	Article	2(e)	of	the	Directive,	which	defines	the	concept	of	‘materially	distort[ing]	the	economic	behaviour	of	consumers’	as	‘using	a	commercial	practice	to	appreciably	impair	the	consumer's	ability	to	make	an	informed	decision,	thereby	causing	the	consumer	to	take	a	transactional	decision	that	he	would	not	have	taken	otherwise.’21		The	Court	underlined	the	relevance	of	the	issue	whether	the	consumer	was	sufficiently	aware	of	the	fact	that	the	computer	was	only	available	with	pre-installed	software	and	whether,	thus,	the	consumer	could	have	made	an	informed	decision	by	choosing	a	computer	of,	for	instance,	a	different	brand	which	would	be	more	suitable	for	his	purposes.	The	level	of	care	by	the	trader	(Sony)	and	the	consumer’s	(Mr	Deroo-Blanquart’s)	level	of	information	about	the	nature	of	the	product	were	already	illustrated	in	the	examination	of	the	previous	condition.	Additionally,	the	Court	pointed	out	the	particular	importance	of	clarifying	the	conditions	and	consequences	of	the	sales	contract,	since	this	is	ultimately	the	information	most	relevant	to	decision-making	by	the	consumer.22	The	Court	stated	that	it	is	up	to	the	referring	court	to	decide	whether	the	ability	of	the	consumer	to	make	an	informed	transactional	decision	was	notably	impaired	in	circumstances,	such	as	those	in	the	present	case,	where	the	consumer	was,	in	particular,	explicitly	informed	that	the	computer	model	in	question	was	sold	only	with	pre-installed	software.23	The	Court	concluded	that	the	answer	to	the	second	and	third	questions	should	be	that	the	practice	of	selling	computers	with	tied-in	software,	with	no	option	to	purchase	the	same	model	without	the	software,	is	not	an	unfair	commercial	practice	contrary	to	Article	5(2)	of	the	UCPD,	unless	it	appears	that	the	practice	is	contrary	to	the	requirements	of	professional	diligence	and	materially	distorts	or	is	likely	to	distort	the	economic	behaviour	of	the	average	consumer	with	regard	to	the	product.	Whether	such	problems	are	present	in	the	circumstances	of	the	case	in	the	main	proceedings	was	noted	to	be	for	the	referring	court	to	resolve	(in	the	light	of	the	relatively	straightforward	guidance	provided	by	the	Court).24		The	Court	then	examined	the	first	question,	which,	in	essence,	asked	whether	it	constitutes	a	misleading	commercial	practice	to	not	specify	the	price	of	each	component	of	the	offer,	i.e.,	the	computer	and	the	pieces	of	software.	Specifically,	the	issue	was	whether	this	would	be	unfair	as	a	misleading	omission,	according	to	Article	5(4)(a)	and	Article	7	of	the	UCPD.25	The	Court		19	Case	C-310/15	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony,	para.	34–36.	It	had	been	held	earlier	that,	especially	if	correct	information	is	provided	to	consumers,	a	combined	offer	can	satisfy	the	requirements	of	fairness	under	the	UCPD:	Joined	Cases	C-261/07	and	299/07	VTB-VAB	v	Total	Belgium,	para.	66.	20	Case	C-310/15	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony,	para.	37.	21	Ibid.,	see	para.	38;	the	UCPD,	Article	2(e).	22	Case	C-310/15	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony,	see	para.	38–41;	see	similarly	Case	C-26/13	Kásler	and	Káslerné	
Rábai,	EU:C:2014:282,	para.	70.	23	Case	C-310/15	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony,	see	para.	41–42.	24	Ibid.,	para.	42.	25	Ibid.,	see	para.	43–44,	26.	
repeated	the	definition	of	misleading	omission	from	Article	7(1)	as	an	omission	that	in	given	circumstances	‘omits	material	information	that	the	average	consumer	needs	in	order	to	make	an	informed	transactional	decision	and	thereby	causes	or	is	likely	to	cause	the	average	consumer	to	make	a	transactional	decision	that	he	would	not	have	taken	otherwise.’26	Additionally,	the	Court	highlighted	Article	7(4)(c),	which	addresses	one	of	the	pieces	of	material	information	that	has	to	be	included	–	the	price.	Under	these	provisions,	the	material	information	consists	of	the	full	price	including	taxes,	or	if	the	price	is	not	available	in	advance	the	method	of	calculating	it,	including	possible	delivery	costs,	or	at	the	very	least	notification	that	these	costs	might	be	included.	The	Court	pointed	out	that	Article	7	concerns	only	the	price	of	the	overall	product	as	material	information,	and	does	not	require	display	of	the	prices	of	its	individual	components.27	Because	of	the	nature	of	the	question	asked	and	the	facts	of	the	case,	the	Court	clarified	the	issue	further.	It	turned	to	Recital	14	of	the	UCPD	and	noted	that	it	follows	from	its	phrasing	that	key	items	of	information	which	are	needed	by	a	consumer	in	order	to	make	an	informed	transactional	decision	constitute	material	information.28	Furthermore,	under	Article	7(1),	whether	a	piece	of	information	is	material	should	be	evaluated	in	casu,	against	the	relevant	factual	background.29	In	this	case,	a	computer	was	offered	for	sale	only	with	the	pre-installed	software,	and	the	Court	established	by	answering	the	two	other	questions	that	there	is	nothing	inherently	unfair	in	that	commercial	practice.30	Hence,	the	Court	concluded	that	failure	to	indicate	the	price	of	each	separate	component	in	a	combined	offer	like	the	one	at	issue	does	not	prevent	the	average	consumer	from	making	an	informed	decision.	Thus,	the	price	of	each	piece	of	pre-installed	software	does	not	constitute	material	information,	and	it	is	not	a	misleading	commercial	practice	to	not	indicate	the	price	of	those	items	of	software.31	
4. Discussion		4.1.	Clarifications	in	the	Ruling	and	Room	for	Discretion	Left	for	the	National	Court	The	ruling	in	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony	provides	clarifications	in	terms	of	the	treatment	of	a	computer	with	pre-installed	software	as	a	combined	offer	and	commercial	practice.	Importantly,	it	states	that	selling	computers	equipped	with	pre-installed	software,	without	the	option	of	buying	the	device	minus	the	software,	does	not	in	itself	constitute	an	unfair	commercial	practice	under	Article	5(2)	of	the	UCPD,	unless	a	national	court	finds	that	in	the	circumstances	of	a	concrete	case	the	practice	is	contrary	to	the	requirements	of	professional	diligence	and	distorts	or	is	likely	to	distort	the	economic	behaviour	of	the	average	consumer	with	regard	to	the	product.32	To	guide	the	related	evaluation	by	the	referring	national	court,	the	Court	especially	emphasised	the	relevance	of	accurate	information	about	tied-in	software	and	
	26	Ibid.,	para.	45;	the	UCPD,	Article	7(1).	27	Case	C-310/15	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony,	see	para.	45–46.	28	Ibid.,	para.	48;	the	UCPD,	Recital	14.	29	Case	C-310/15	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony,	para.	49.	30	Ibid.,	see	para.	50.	31	Ibid.,	para.	51–52.	32	Ibid.,	para.	32–37,	42,	53.	
its	implications	being	communicated	to	the	consumer	and	of	the	possibility	to	cancel	the	sale	afterwards.33		Furthermore,	the	fact	that	including	pre-installed	software	seemed	to	meet	the	expectations	of	a	notable	proportion	of	consumers	was	important	for	the	in	casu	evaluation	of	the	appropriateness	of	the	business	practice.	The	Court	underlined	that	circumstances	such	as	those	of	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony	are	likely	to	satisfy	the	requirements	of	professional	diligence	and	appropriate	business	behaviour	–	the	national	court	was	thus	given	relatively	clear	guidance	as	to	what	its	conclusion	should	be.34	Additionally,	the	role	of	information	provided	to	the	consumer	was	highlighted	in	Deroo-
Blanquart	v	Sony	in	a	manner	which	actually	relatively	strongly	guides	the	referring	court,	even	though	the	final	evaluation	as	to	whether	the	practice	of	selling	computers	with	pre-installed	software	but	without	the	option	of	merely	buying	the	computer	might	affect	the	consumer’s	decisions	or	ability	to	make	informed	decisions	about	the	relevant	product	was	left	for	the	national	court’s	consideration.35		Moreover,	the	judgment	in	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony	highlights	that	in	terms	of	material	information	to	be	communicated	to	consumers	in	the	case	of	a	computer	with	pre-installed	software,	it	is	the	overall	price	of	the	package	that	is	relevant.	The	prices	of	individual	pieces	of	software	need	not	be	indicated.36	The	Court	presented	this	finding	as	a	result	of	interpreting	the	provisions	on	misleading	omissions	and	material	information	(Articles	5(4)(a)	and	7	of	the	UCPD).37	The	fact	that	the	computer	model	relevant	in	the	case	was	only	offered	for	sale	with	the	pre-installed	software	contributed	to	the	conclusion.38	The	ruling	illustrates	that	even	though	further	details	could	be	considered	interesting,	the	law	focuses	on	what	information	is	absolutely	necessary.	Considering	the	substantive	findings	and	interpretations	presented	in	the	ruling,	the	conclusions	of	the	Court	are	not	surprising.	As	illustrated	above,	the	Court	relied	on	its	previous	judgments,	which	examined	the	interpretation	of	the	UCPD,	in	particular	Joined	Cases	C-261/07	and	299/07	VTB-VAB	v	Total	Belgium.	Another	aspect	of	the	case	is	the	critique	that	arose	from	other	fields	of	law,	in	particular	that	the	Court	missed	an	opportunity	to	address	some	burning	issues	of	IT	law.	Despite	relatively	few	critical	voices	of	this	ruling,	the	common	underlying	objection	seems	to	be	that	the	Court	did	not	understand	the	significance	of	its	decision	and	missed	an	opportunity	to	catch	up	with	the	demands	of	rapidly	developing	technology	and	especially	the	free	software	movements.39	While	these	critiques	hold	some	merit,	it	is	at	the	same	time	necessary	to	recognise	that	the	Court	is,	firstly,	confined	to	the	limits	of	the	question	asked	–	in	the	present	case,	the	realm	of		33	Ibid.,	para.	35–37,	40–42,	53.	34	Ibid.,	in	particular	para.	35–37.	35	Ibid.,	in	particular	para.	41.	36	Ibid.,	para.	45–53.	37	Ibid.,	para.	43–52.	38	Ibid.,	in	particular	para.	50–51.	39	See	for	instance	I.	Emanuilov	‘Free	as	in	freedom?	A	tale	of…forced	bundling’,	KU	Leuven	Centre	for	IT	
and	IP	Law	(2016),	https://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/blog/free-as-in-freedom-a-tale-of-forced-bundling/;	J.	Baker	‘Non,	Monsieur!	–	Sony	wins	battle	over	preinstalled	Windows	in	Europe’s	top	court’	
Arstechnica	(2016),	http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/09/sony-wins-pre-installed-software-windows-battle-cjeu/.	
the	UCPD.		Secondly,	in	its	interpretation,	the	Court	has	to	walk	a	fine	line	between	the	relevant	legal	starting	points	and	the	real	life	consequences	of	rulings.	Additionally,	one	must	also	consider	the	tension	within	the	goals	of	the	UCPD	itself,	specifically	the	goal	of	balancing	consumer	protection	on	one	side,	and	smooth	operation	of	the	internal	market	on	the	other.40	This	combination	of	goals	signifies,	among	other	things,	that	protection	of	consumers,	let	alone	increased	consumer	choice,	may	not	be	promoted	without	limitations.	Some	further	remarks	should	also	be	presented	from	the	standpoint	of	the	interrelationships	of	full	harmonization	by	the	UCPD,	interpretations	by	the	Court	of	Justice,	and	the	role	of	national	courts.	The	nature	of	the	approach	of	the	UCPD	and	its	provisions	as	open-ended	legislation,	which	underlines	the	significance	of	the	reasoning	by	national	courts	applying	the	law	to	the	particular	circumstances	of	each	case,	may	be	critically	contrasted	with	the	idea	of	the	intended	full	harmonization.41		The	systematic	choices	of	the	Directive	are	prone	to	leave	notable	room	for	discretion	by	national	courts.	In	turn,	this	may	also	mean	that	the	Directive	and	the	law	implementing	it	may	be	applied	in	a	divergent	manner.	As	is	well	known,	it	is	for	the	domestic	courts	to	apply	the	law	to	the	facts,	whereas	the	Court	of	Justice	provides	information	on	the	correct	interpretation	of	EU	law.42	Nonetheless,	judgments	such	as	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony	illustrate	that	when	answering	preliminary	ruling	questions,	the	Court	of	Justice	is	willing,	at	least	at	points,	to	take	a	significantly	active	role,	guiding	national	courts	to	such	an	extent	that	the	‘correct’	conclusions	are	nearly	ready	on	the	basis	of	the	reasoning	of	the	Court	of	Justice.	This	contributes	to	achieving	full	harmonization.43	However,	among	other	matters	the	proportion	of	cases	where	preliminary	ruling	requests	are	not	made	may	continue	to	potentially	create	issues	related	to	divergent	interpretations	and	applications.		4.2.	Pre-installed	Software	and	Appropriate	Business	Practices	from	a	Broader	Perspective	The	UCPD,	which	constitutes	B2C	legislation,	with	a	‘side-effect’	of	granting	certain	protection	to	companies44,	is	part	of	a	broader	European	picture	of	law	on	appropriate	and	inappropriate	business	behaviour	and	trading	practices.	The	whole,	which	includes	EU	and	national	legislation	on	unfair	commercial	practices	and	on	unfair	contract	terms,	as	well	as	EU	law	on	free	movement	and	EU	and	national	competition	law,	is	not	as	coherent	and	clear	as	one	could	hope	for.45	Even	though	the	judgment	in	Deroo-Blanquart	v	Sony	is	not	highly	surprising	or		40	See	also,	for	instance,	J.	Stuyck,	‘The	Court	of	Justice	and	the	Unfair	Commercial	Practices	Directive',	52	
CMLR	(2015),	p.	721,	750–751	in	particular.	41	See	the	UCPD,	in	particular	Recitals	3–8,	11–20;	see	also	J.	Stuyck	52	CMLR	(2015)	p.	721,	721–722,	749–752.	42	See	further,	for	example,	A.	Arnull,	The	European	Union	and	its	Court	of	Justice	(2nd	edition,	OUP,	2006),	p.	96,	104–114;	consider	also	P.	Rott,	‘Unfair	Contract	Terms’,	in	C.	Twigg-Flesner	(ed.),	Research	
Handbook	on	EU	Consumer	and	Contract	Law	(EE,	2016),	p.	287,	296–297.	43	In	the	context	of	the	minimum	harmonisation	Council	Directive	93/13/EEC	of	5	April	1993	on	unfair	terms	in	consumer	contracts	[1993]	OJ	L	95/29,	the	Court	has	originally	underlined	that	it	should	abstain	from	applying	law	to	concrete	cases,	thus	leaving	this	for	national	courts	(see	for	example	Case	C-237/02	
Freiburger	Kommunalbauten	GmbH	Baugesellschaft,	EU:C:2004:209,	para.	21–25).	More	recently,	the	Court	has,	however,	also	given	very	specific	guidance,	leaving	little	room	for	discretion	(see	for	example	Case	C-92/11	RWE	Vertrieb	AG,	EU:C:2013:180,	para.	40–55).	See	also	further	P.	Rott,	in	C.	Twigg-Flesner	(ed.),	Research	Handbook	on	EU	Consumer	and	Contract	Law,	p.	296–299.	44	See	the	UCPD,	in	particular	Recital	8,	which	notes	that	the	Directive	‘also	indirectly	protects	legitimate	businesses	from	their	competitors’	and	thus	‘guarantees	fair	competition	in	fields	coordinated	by	it’.		45	See	for	further	critical	discussion,	for	example,	J.	Stuyck	52	CMLR	(2015),	p.	721–726,	743–752.	
remarkable	as	observed	merely	from	the	standpoint	of	the	UCPD,	factual	situations	such	as	that	visible	in	the	case	are	prone	to	raise	questions	about	interfaces	and	interrelationships	between	unfair	trading,	consumer	protection	and	competition	law	regimes	and	enforcement	systems.	The	relevant	bodies	of	rules	and	systems	of	enforcement	are	significantly	separate	from	each	other	and	planned	to	‘keep	within	their	own	boxes’	–	thus,	resolving	the	correct	application	of	one	Directive	does	not	mean	that	all	is	well	with	regard	to	a	factual	situation.	The	practice	of	selling	computers	only	with	certain	pre-installed	software	could	hypothetically	be	problematic	from	the	perspective	of	competition	law	prohibition	of	abuse	of	dominance,	Article	102	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	EU	(TFEU).46	An	evaluation	from	the	standpoint	of	the	UCPD	does	not	explore	this	issue,	or	other	matters	beyond	the	scope	of	the	Directive.				Nevertheless,	it	should	be	noted	that	even	when	observed	in	a	broader	EU	law	context,	tying	is	not	perceived	as	absolutely	and	universally	harmful.		For	instance,	the	seminal	Microsoft	case	highlights	the	complexity	of	tying	as	a	concept,	as	well	as	detailed	analysis	of	the	factors	that	can	affect	evaluation	in	terms	of	illegality.47		The	several	potentially	relevant	bodies	of	norms	signify	that	a	practice	such	as	selling	pre-installed	software	would	have	to	be	questioned	from	the	perspective	of	several	sources	of	rules,	likely,	at	least	to	some	extent,	in	separate	proceedings,	in	order	to	gain	a	full	picture	of	whether	the	factual	situation	entails	illegal	aspects.48	In	some	of	the	proceedings	needed,	the	position	of	a	consumer-complainant	may	be	weak.	This	could	be	said,	in	particular,	about	the	field	of	competition	law.49	Moreover,	in	the	EU,	the	availability	and	practical	usefulness	of	collective	
	46	Under	Article	102	TFEU,	it	would	have	to	be	evaluated	whether	the	undertaking	in	question	is	in	a	dominant	market	position	and,	if	so,	whether	tying	computers	and	software	together	constitutes	(unjustifiable)	abuse.	These	issues	cannot	be	resolved	on	the	basis	of	information	available	in	Deroo-
Blanquart	v	Sony,	but	the	hypothetical	relevance	in	situations	akin	to	that	of	the	case	should	be	noted;	see	also	on	tying	pieces	of	software	together	Case	T-201/04	Microsoft,	in	particular	para.	841–1167;	Commission	Decision	of	16.12.2009,	Case	COMP/C-3/39.530	–	Microsoft	(tying).	For	a	broader	understanding	of	the	Commission’s	views	on	tying,	see	also	Guidance	on	the	Commission's	enforcement	priorities	in	applying	Article	82	of	the	EC	Treaty	to	abusive	exclusionary	conduct	by	dominant	undertakings	[2009]	OJ	C	45/7,	in	particular	para.	47–62.	On	the	interface	of	competition	and	consumer	issues	see	for	instance	C.	Osti,	‘Interpreting	Convergence:	Where	Antitrust	meets	Consumer	Law’,	5	
European	Competition	Journal	(2009),	p.	377.	47	Case	T-201/04	Microsoft,	in	particular	para.	842,	850–870.	48	As	to	enforcement	and	interfaces	with	national	law	in	the	case	of	the	UCPD,	see	J.	Stuyck	52	CMLR	(2015),	p.	743–748;	W.	van	Boom,	‘Unfair	Commercial	Practices’,	in	C.	Twigg-Flesner	(ed.),	Research	
Handbook	on	EU	Consumer	and	Contract	Law	(EE,	2016),	p.	388,	395–404.	As	to	the	judgment	in	Deroo-
Blanquart	v	Sony,	this	was	not	received	enthusiastically	everywhere	(see	footnote	39),	which	underlines	the	prospect	that	similar	factual	situations	could	raise	concerns	which	now	are	outside	the	scope	of	the	case.		49	A	complaint	or	a	request	for	investigation	may	be	submitted	to	the	European	Commission	or	national	competition	authorities,	but	they	are	not	under	obligation	to	start	an	investigation	(see	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	1/2003	of	16	December	2002	on	the	implementation	of	the	rules	on	competition	laid	down	in	Articles	81	and	82	of	the	Treaty	[2003]	OJ	L	1/1,	Articles	4–7);	consumers	may	also	bring	private	enforcement,	that	is,	contractual	or	damages	claims	in	national	courts,	but	succeeding	in	such	claims	remains	challenging;	for	further	discussion,	see,	for	example,	K.J.	Cseres	and	J.	Mendes,	'Consumers’	access	to	EU	competition	law	procedures:	Outer	and	inner	limits',	51	CMLR	(2014),	p.	483;	K.	Havu,	‘The	Digital	Single	Market	and	E-commerce:	Some	Remarks	concerning	Online	Sales	and	Distribution	from	the	Private	Enforcement	Point	of	View’,	9	GCLR	(2016),	p.	50,	51,	54–55.	
redress	mechanisms,	which	can	be	especially	useful	in	situations	involving	multiple	weak	parties	such	as	consumers,	remain	dependent	on	Member	State	laws.50	It	is	evident	that	no	simple	legal	solution	and	related	comprehensive	enforcement	framework,	covering	unfair	commercial	practices	and	similar	issues,	competition	matters	and	consumer	protection	–	and	combining	the	EU	and	national	system	levels	in	a	smart	manner	–	is	easily	available.	Nevertheless,	any	possibility	to	increase	coherence	and	cooperation	between	different	legal	‘approaches’	should	be	discussed	and	embraced.	
	50	See	Commission	Recommendation	of	11	June	2013	on	common	principles	for	injunctive	and	compensatory	collective	redress	mechanisms	in	the	Member	States	concerning	violations	of	rights	granted	under	Union	Law	(2013/396/EU)	[2013]	OJ	L	201/60;	for	discussion	see,	for	instance,	M.	Ioannidou,	Consumer	Involvement	in	Private	EU	Competition	Law	Enforcement	(OUP,	2015).	
